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ABSTRACT 
 
Friend or Foe? 
Martial Race Ideology and the Experience of Highland Scottish and Irish Regiments in 
Mid-Victorian Conflicts, 1853-1870 
 
by 
Adam M. Spivey 
 
This thesis examines martial race ideology in the British Army during the mid-nineteenth 
century. A “martial race” was a group of people that the British considered to excel in the art of 
warfare due to biological and cultural characteristics. This thesis examines perceived “martial” 
natures or lack thereof of the Highland Scots and the Irish during this era. Central to this analysis 
are the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Indian Mutiny of 1857 which provided opportunities 
for soldiers to display their “martial” qualities. The Crimean War was the first war where the 
daily newspapers covered every aspect of the war using correspondents, and it gave soldiers the 
chance to gain recognition through this medium. The Indian Mutiny represented a crisis for 
Britain, and it gave soldiers the opportunity to be recognized as “stabilizers of the empire.” 
However, despite their similarities, the Highland regiments became some of the most revered 
regiments while the Irish came to be seen as untrustworthy, leading many in the British 
government to initiate efforts to decrease the role that the Irish played in Britain’s conflicts. This 
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reluctance was due to the turmoil that erupted as a result of the anti-Union Fenian Brotherhood in 
Ireland during the 1860s. The difficulty in stabilizing Ireland in the wake of Fenian terrorist 
attacks also exposed old prejudices of the Irish related to religion, race, and class. This was 
evidenced through parliamentary debates and British newspapers reporting on the crises.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In June of 1886, the Liberal government of William Gladstone initiated a Home Rule Bill 
through Parliament that would have given the Irish self-government and control over local 
legislative affairs. Parliament remained sharply divided on whether to grant Ireland Home Rule. 
The debate sparked intense controversy, tended to harden positions, and revived old prejudices 
that have long colored British perceptions of Ireland. Some argued that the Irish lacked the 
capability for self-government. While others argued that since Ireland contributed a substantial 
amount to British defense and fiscal policy, they deserved a separate parliament which governed 
their local affairs. One side, represented by Bernard Coleridge, MP for Sheffield Attercliffe 
argued that, “I do not doubt that once you give Ireland the legitimate control of her own affairs, 
and allow her to choose her own rulers, that those rulers will be the salt of the Irish race.”1 
Opponents of granting self-government to Ireland such as Joseph Chamberlain argued that Home 
Rule would raise the specter of a resurgent Catholicism in Ireland that would tyrannize the 
minority Protestants, “It is true—it is absolutely true—that to secure rights has been, and is, the 
aim of Christian civilization: to destroy them, and to establish the resistless, domineering action 
of a purely central power is the aim of the Roman policy.”2 Others emphasized the socio-
economic status of the majority of Ireland, arguing that its predominantly in low-income 
                                                          
1 Bernard Coleridge, “Second Reading,” in House of Commons Debates, vol. 305, 13 May 1886, accessed 
15 December 2016, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1886/may/13/second-reading-adjourned-
debate#S3V0305P0_18860513_HOC_109. 
 
2 Joseph Chamberlain, “Second Reading,” in House of Commons Debates, vol. 306, 1 June 1886,  accessed 
15 December 2016, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1886/jun/01/second-reading-adjourned-debate-
ninth#S3V0306P0_18860601_HOC_62.  
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agricultural laborers were not the basis upon which a good and independent government could be 
built. Some members in Parliament used these class distinctions to make the case that the Irish 
remained uneducated and susceptible to the influence of Catholicism and nationalist agitators. 
Ultimately, Parliament was too divided and the Home Rule Bill failed to pass. As such, the Irish 
problem continued to fester for the next century.  
How could such varied opinions of the Irish exist amongst Britain’s ruling elite? These 
viewpoints demonstrate the lens through which the British, as a whole viewed the Irish race, and 
provides insights into how these stereotypes affected the British Army’s attitude toward the Irish. 
The Irish were not the only group within the British Isles that experienced prejudice. For much 
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the Highland Scots had also been viewed as 
inferior. Highland Scots had been viewed with skepticism by the British due to the Jacobite 
Rebellions that occurred in the north of Scotland in 1715 and 1745 in an attempt to protect 
Catholicism and restore a Stuart king to the throne. During the revolts and in their immediate 
aftermath, many caricatures proliferated throughout England which highlighted the “uncivilized” 
behavior of the Highland Scot, spreading unflattering depictions of Highlanders. 
In one of their caricatures, Sawney in the Bog House, a Scottish Highlander was depicted 
attempting to use a public bathroom in London but found himself perplexed as to how to use one. 
Instead of sitting on the hole designated for the seat, he sits in the space between two and sticks 
both feet inside the holes.3 In addition, The Scots Magazine published an article in 1753 
highlighting a trial for murder committed by a Highlander. In this magazine the prosecutor 
decided to use the man on trial, James Stewart to characterize Highlanders in general. While he 
                                                          
3 “Sawney in the Bog-house.” The British Museum, 1745, accessed December 15, 2016, 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1478257&partId
=1&people=113806&peoA=113806-2-60&view=list&page=1.  
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noted areas of “improvements” in regards to assimilating the Highland regions within Britain, he 
still believed them to be “uncivilized.” As the magazine reported, “The highlands of Scotland are 
in this age less barbarous than they have been in former times; yet, in our own time, there have 
been such instances of remaining barbarism. These countries stand yet in need of being better 
civilized.”4 In this context, race, which included physical appearance, social, and cultural 
characteristics, became the primary tool that the British used to define the Irish as the “other.” By 
the late nineteenth century, “advancements” in biology, particularly scientific racism, simply 
hardened Britain’s negative attitudes towards the Irish. 
 The development of scientific racism also influenced the way that the British caricatured 
the Irish as a people. Ever since the Tudor period, when the Irish had been depicted as 
woodkarnes, bandits who lived in forests outside of “civilization,” the British depictions of the 
Irish had not been favorable.5 By the latter half of the nineteenth century, British cartoons, 
inspired by scientific racism, began depicting the Irish as a sub-human species, often as a 
monkey or an ape. In one cartoon published in 1861, the caricature depicted the Irishman as an 
ape writing a treatise on treason while a British policeman, ever vigilant, stands over the ape.6 
While Darwin and his successors created a new paradigm to view others, we must 
remember that from the very moment the British began to establish colonies in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, various attempts were made to classify and sort through the disparate 
                                                          
4 “Extracts of the Trial of James Stewart,” The Scots Magazine, 1 October 1753, accessed March  15, 2017, 
http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/BL/0000545/17531001/007/0022?browse=true.  
 
5 Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 6. 
 
6 “The Irish Ape and the British Policeman.” Punch, 1861, accessed October 25, 2015, 
https://www.quora.com/How-have-attitudes-towards-the-Irish-changed-in-England-over-time  
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racial differences between the British and those they colonized. According to John Rankin, the 
British debated whether or not the “others” they encountered had any similarities to themselves. 
This is evident in the Age of Exploration through the colonial period, as Europeans attempted to 
understand how they related culturally and biologically to the rest of the world. During this 
period, many questioned whether any innate and predetermined differences existed amongst 
different races, or whether cultural or geographical factors had any role to play.7 
During the latter half of the century, new advancements in evolutionary biology and the 
Darwinian theory of natural selection became ingrained in academic discourse and some utilized 
these arguments to advocate that certain races had an innate deficiency in comparison to others. 
Such arguments, known as Social Darwinism, usually highlighted white “superiority” over 
darker skinned Asians and Africans.8 The Irish occupied an in between position as European, but 
not Anglo-Saxon. They were sometimes depicted as near equals with the British, but they could 
just as easily be lumped in with those viewed as “inferior.” Indeed, many argued that the Irish, 
akin to non-Europeans, had an innate sense of laziness and a proclivity for disobedience and 
violence. This template served as a stark contrast from what the British believed the hard 
working and stable Anglo-Saxon possessed.9 As a result of this classification, many Britons felt 
                                                          
7 John Rankin, Healing the African Body: British Medicine in West Africa (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2015), 17. 
 
8 Peter Gay, The Cultivation of Hatred: The Bourgeois Experience, Victoria to Freud (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1993), 39 
 
9 Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 23. 
 
10 
 
it was their duty to govern the Irish and others with the purpose of spreading their economic and 
religious values.10 
According to Linda Colley, the British utilized the differences they saw in others they 
encountered to define and construct their own national identity. These differences had not 
necessarily been racial or biological in nature. Colley emphasizes the importance of cultural 
differences by examining the role that Protestantism played in national identity.11 Before 
scientific racism, race served as an umbrella term to define a group of people based on social and 
cultural characteristics. In the case of the Irish, Michael de Nie has simplified British attitudes by 
stating that the Irish had always existed in their minds as a Celt, a Catholic, and a peasant.12  
Therefore, by the late nineteenth century, the traditional Darwinian narrative seemed to confirm 
the sterotypes of the Irish that the British held for centuries.  
The two main factions of racial theorists at this time that engaged in this debate were the 
monogenists and polygenists. Monogenists believed that every racial and ethnic group of 
humanity had one common ancestor which made them genetically related. Polygenists 
subscribed to the opposite view which stated that every race came from a series multiple and 
unrelated ancestors. These two competing factions shaped the construction of nineteenth century 
race ideology. In the first half of the nineteenth century, monogenists employed the widely 
accepted story of Adam and Eve to cement their position. This approach was adopted by 
missionaries who, because of their travels, were some of the most respected voices in the debate 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 3 
 
11 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 5. 
 
12 Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 23. 
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over race and the origins of humanity. As Catherine Hall has argued, the early nineteenth century 
represented a time where monogenists, such as the missionaries, viewed people of other races as 
genetically related despite cultural distinctions. As a result, missionaries believed in a “universal 
brotherhood” where different racial groups, such as Africans, could be molded in the image of 
Britons and become just as “civilized” as them.13 
However, by the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of a “universal brotherhood” began to 
lose favorability. The main reason for this switch was due to insecurity and a hardening of racial 
attitudes caused by the Indian Mutiny and the 1865 revolted in Jamaica.14 These events called 
into question mutability and improvement, giving rise to a more pessimistic view by the mid 
nineteenth century. By this point, various mission sites in the British Empire had not yielded the 
anticipated conversion rates resulting in dissolution and doubt. This rule applied to the mission 
field as well. During the early half of the nineteenth century, many missionaries that went abroad 
became disenchanted with their experience of empire building, and they found the natives of 
their mission fields to be much less docile and malleable than they once believed.15  
As a result, the mid-nineteenth century engendered a new model of racial thinking that 
effectively eliminated and severely marginalized the once idealized concept of a “universal 
brotherhood.” During this time period, many in Britain made the attempt to separate and elevate 
those of Anglo-Saxon descent from those that they colonized. This attitude was exemplified by 
                                                          
13 Catherine Hall, Civilizing Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 338. 
 
14 Ibid., 284. 
 
15 Richard Price, Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-
Century Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 77-79. See also Catherine Hall, Civilizing Subjects: 
Metropole and Colon y in the English Imagination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 360. 
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Charles Dickens, a famous nineteenth-century English novelist, who wrote an article in 1853 that 
characterized dark-skinned peoples as noble savages. In his essay, Darwin remarks on what he 
sees as the condition of Native Americans living in North America. As he stated on the lifestyle 
of these “savages,”  
“To come to the point at once, I beg to say that I have not the least belief in the 
Noble Savage. I consider him a prodigious nuisance and an enormous 
superstition. I do not care what he calls me. I call him a savage, and I call a 
savage something highly desirable to be civilized off the face of the earth.”16 
However, despite his characterization of the  “noble savage,” Dickens later goes on to state that 
while he still found them to be inferior when compared to Europeans, he still believed in the old 
monogenist way of thinking which stated that they ought to be treated in a respectful manner and 
exposed to Christianity and its redemptive qualities. As Dickens stated,  
“We have no greater justification for being cruel to the miserable object, than for 
being cruel to a William Shakespeare or an Isaac Newton; but he passes away 
before an immeasurably better and higher power [i.e., that of Christianity] than 
ever ran wild in any earthly woods, and the world will be all the better when this 
place knows him no more.”17 
However, when Dickens wrote those words in 1853, he was not alone in sharing the sentiment of 
inequality between different racial groups. By the 1850s, the idea of a “universal brotherhood” 
began to fall out of favor amongst many scientists. 
In 1850, Scotsman Robert Knox unequivocally stated in The Races of Man that different 
races possessed vastly different characteristics. In The Races of Man, Knox asserts that a 
hierarchy of races existed with the Europeans at the top of the pyramid and groups such as the 
                                                          
16 Charles Dickens, The Works of Charles Dickens: Reprinted Pieces, vol. xxxiv  (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1900), 120. 
 
17 Ibid., 127. 
 
13 
 
Aborigines of Australia and Africans at the bottom.18 To some extent, monogenists and 
missionaries would have subscribe to the viewpoint that the British or Europeans were culturally 
superior to those they colonized, but Knox took this level of ethnocentrism to another level when 
he said,  
“If anyone insists with me that a Negro or Tasmanian accidentally born in 
England becomes thereby an Englishman, I yield the point; but should he further 
insist, that he, the said Negro or Tasmanian, may become also a Saxon or 
Scandinavian, I must contend against so ludicrous and error.”19 
This statement would mean that no instruction or training would “civilize” an indigenous subject 
from the empire. Instead, they would be destined to remain forever inferior. Knox devoted a 
portion of his book to articulating his views on the Irish as a racial group. He stated, “Seven 
hundred year of absolute possession has not advanced by a single step the amalgamation of the 
Irish Celt with the Saxon English.”20 To Knox, the Irish were a separate race.   
The contours of these arguments and the fascination between perceived differences in 
races culminated in the works of nineteenth-century biologist, Charles Darwin, particularly his 
1871 work, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. In this book, Darwin applied 
the theories of evolution and natural selection to particular segments of the human race, 
reiterating Knox’s argument that certain segments of the human race had more biological traits in 
common with other animals of different species.21 As Darwin stated explicitly in the introduction 
of his book, “The sole object of this work is to consider, firstly, whether man, like every other 
                                                          
18 Robert Knox, The Races of Men (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1850), 10. 
 
19 Ibid., 13. 
 
20 Ibid., 21 
. 
21 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1871), 9 
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species, is descended from some pre-existing form; secondly, the manner of his development; 
and thirdly, the value of the differences between the so-called races of man.”22  
Major European powers of the nineteenth century employed scientific racism to construct 
a hierarchy of races. In the British mindset, Anglo-Saxons occupied the pinnacle of the racial 
hierarchy followed by Celtic races such as the Irish and continued all the way down to the so-
called darker races that inhabited Asia and Africa. In Descent of Man, Darwin contrasted the 
differences between the Scottish and the Irish when he stated,  
“The carless, squalid, unaspiring Irishman multiplies like rabbits: the frugal, 
foreseeing, self-respecting, ambitious Scot, stern in his morality, spiritual in his 
faith, sagacious and disciplined in his intelligence, passes his best years in 
struggle and celibacy, marries late, and leaves few behind him. Given a land 
originally peopled by a thousand Saxons and a thousand Celts-and in a dozen 
generations five-sixths of the population would be Celts, but five-sixths of the 
property, of the power, of the intellect, would belong to the one-sixth of the 
Saxons that remained.”23 
Darwin was clear that Anglo-Saxons, like the English and Scots, were natural rulers and this 
justified British involvement, dominance, and rule over Ireland and Irish people. While the 
British had always held views that labeled Ireland as inferior, they now had a “scientific” way to 
justify their prejudice against them and to elevate the Scottish.24 
 In another portion of Descent of Man, Darwin further explained which races he believed 
could be categorized as “civilized races.” In this classification, Darwin examined his findings 
through the context of European imperialism, and he believed that the people which made up the 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 3 
 
23 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1871), 
167-168. 
 
24 Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 7. 
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“savage races” would eventually die out and be replaced by the “civilized races.” As Darwin 
explained in Descent of Man, “At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, 
the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace throughout the world the 
savage races.”25 
Prior to the British Army adopting the basic tenets of martial race ideology from the mid-
nineteenth century onward, some segments of Western society dating back to at least the 
eighteenth-century believed that humans living in tribal societies possessed certain 
characteristics that made them an asset during a time of war. In particular, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, a well-known philosophe of the Enlightenment period, wrote a discourse celebrating 
man in its most natural state. Rousseau believed that in the state of nature man is ultimately 
considered “good” and not inherently “evil.” According to Rousseau, as the stages of nature 
progress, “civilization” serves as a force that ultimately corrupted man by making them weak 
and unable to defend themselves.26  The British Army were clearly influenced by such ideas, 
preferring rural recruits who had not been polluted and weakened by “modern society” or 
industrialization. While Rousseau praised man in his natural state, he believed that a fine line had 
to be achieved between existing in a state where man is completely cut off from civilization and 
one where civilization has made man weak and decadent.27 As he stated, “Whereas nothing can 
                                                          
25 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1871), 
193. 
 
26 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Origins of Inequality (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004), 32 
 
27 Ibid., 32. 
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be more gentle than he in his primitive state, when placed by nature at an equal distance from the 
stupidity of brutes, and the pernicious good sense of civilized man.”28  
Rousseau’s ideas put him at odds with the general notion of the gradual progression of 
reason and science. While Rousseau argued against immersing oneself in “civilization” and 
praised many aspects of primitive man, he took his argument to another dimension when he 
talked about “civilization’s” effect on the military. He believed the evolution of the “state of 
nature” from the primitive state of the “noble savage” to “civilization” contributed to a loss of 
“military virtue,” and made society decadent and unable to defend itself if attacked by an outside 
force.29 One logical extension of his argument is that the “civilized” and “sophisticated” English 
would be forced to rely upon so-called “lesser” people for protection. 
These ideas played a factor after the 1857 Mutiny in India against native soldiers who 
had previously fought for the British East India Company. After this conflict, the British Army 
began classifying certain groups serving in their armed forces as “martial” and “non-martial.” In 
the Indian subcontinent specifically, the British sought to recruit groups located in the northwest 
frontier such as the Sikhs and Gurkhas.30 This preference by the British came at the expense of 
the Bengali recruits they typically used pre-mutiny. The British believed that the growing 
urbanization of Bengal had made them weak, effeminate, and incapable of defending Britain’s 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 32. 
 
29 David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare As We Know It (New 
York: Mariner Books, 2008), 79. 
 
30 Amar Farooqui, “Divide and Rule? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Century 
Colonial India,” Social Scientist 43(2015): 53. 
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empire.31 However, the concept of a “martial race” could also be extended to groups within the 
British Isles that also assisted in suppressing the Indian Mutiny such as the Highland Scots.  
While both the Irish and the Highland Scots found themselves at odds with the English, 
the Highland Scots would see their position within the British Army improve. However, the Irish 
would continue to see their position stagnate. The events that altered the structural changes 
within Britain’s hierarchy of races were the Crimean War against Russia that lasted from 1853-
1856 and the Sepoy Mutiny in India in 1857. In these conflicts, both Irish and Highland Scots 
had been present in the British armed forces tasked with taking the Russian naval base, 
Sevastopol, and suppressing the rebellion. In the aftermath of these conflicts, the Highland Scots 
found themselves as the most desired soldiers within Britain’s imperial armed forces. Yet despite 
the fact that the Irish made up a significant portion of the forces in the Crimea and India and had 
success in both conflicts fighting alongside the Highland Scots, the Irish did not receive the same 
recognition as the Scots, nor did such sacrifice improve their image. 
During the 1860s, both Ireland and Britain became the victims of both conventional and 
unconventional attacks by the Irish Fenian Brotherhood, an anti-Union terrorist organization 
whose goal was to establish an Irish republic independent from the parliament at Westminster. 
While the attempts of the Fenians ultimately failed, Britain’s experience of dealing with the Irish 
terrorists exposed the prejudice that many in Britain had held for centuries and helps to explain 
why, after fighting in the Crimean War and the Sepoy armies during the Indian Mutiny, the Irish 
still were not seen as a “martial race.”  
                                                          
31 Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late 
Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 80. 
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These allegations specifically dealt with racial allegations which stated that the Irish had 
a “diminished intellect,” the attempts of “illiberal” Catholic clergy to corrupt the Irish into 
revolting against the Protestant union, and the inherent poverty that plagued Ireland. As a result, 
many in the military and the British government sought to rely less on both Irish troops and the 
Irish militia in efforts at peace-keeping at home and in the empire as well. This study utilizes 
both parliamentary debates and British newspapers to determine the extent to which Irish 
prejudice permeated the British government and the public at large and ultimately contributed to 
the classification of Irish soldiers as an “un-martial” race. This research also seeks to 
simultaneously demonstrate why the Highland Scots, despite their own disturbances and 
disloyalty in the previous century, were not only seen as “martial” but became the very backbone 
of the British Army and the empire. Understanding this difference will provide insights into 
British cultural attitudes and ultimately expose the ways in which the British not only 
administered and protected its empire, but how it understood its role. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STABILIZING THE EMPIRE: THE HIGHLAND REGIMENTS  
 
First demonstrating their value in the Seven Years War, Highland units became a feared 
and effective fighting force for the British Army. The expansion of the British Empire in the 
Seven Years’ War provided the impetus for Highland integration in the British Army after the 
Battle of Quebec in 1759. In this theatre of war, the 78th Highland Regiment provided an 
instrumental role in capturing the city. By accomplishing this feat, the 78th helped secure North 
America for Britain’s dominion.32 By the close of the eighteenth century, Scots overall gained 
access to and participated in the imperial enterprise by serving as soldiers, tradesmen, and civil 
servants in the colonies.33 Initially viewed with skepticism due to the Jacobite Rebellions of 1715 
and 1745 that attempted to place a Stuart king back on the throne, Highlanders became an 
integral part of the British Army. While the British Army held Highlanders in high esteem since 
the fall of Quebec, the civilian government and public were slower to recognize the value of 
Highland units. 
The importance of Highland units in suppressing the Mutiny, coupled with the expansion 
of the popular press allowed for a re-evaluation of Highlanders and ultimately Scottish people. 
From dangerous and rebellious, Scots were still viewed as different, but the fearsome qualities 
they held were useful to an expanding Empire. For Scots, this led to a reevaluation of Scotland’s 
                                                          
32 Tim Newark, Highlander: The History of the Legendary Highland Soldier (New York, Skyhorse 
Publishing, 2009), 42-51 
 
33 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 123. 
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relationship with England and its place within the Empire but ultimately, as will be demonstrated 
in the following chapter the way in which the Jacobite Rebellions were understood in England. 
 Increasingly viewed as an elite warrior class, Highlanders came to embody the fighting 
spirit and masculine culture which drove the British Army. The visibility, praise, and 
representation of Highlanders, resulted in the Scots being perceived as a martial race. A martial 
race was a group of people who demonstrated aggressive and masculine conduct that highlighted 
their perceived abilities as an elite fighting force that could be employed throughout the empire if 
colonial sites became unstable, as they did during the mid-nineteenth century.34  
This understanding of Scots as a martial race had ramifications not just for the Empire 
but how the Jacobite rebellions were understood. Originally understood as an act of betrayal, a 
century of fighting for the British led to a re-evaluation of the causes. By the mid nineteenth 
century, the rebellions were increasingly understood, not as an act of betrayal, but natural 
coming from a martial race. In this context, war was the only way Highland Scots knew how to 
demonstrate their grievances. Scots were not untrustworthy but victims of their martial 
tendencies. The same tendencies, when harnessed by Britain, helped secure and protect the 
Empire. 
Prior to the Mutiny, the British East India Company governed the Indian subcontinent. 
Initially established as a trading enterprise in the early 1600s, the company established its own 
military force and gradually conquered territory throughout the mid-eighteenth to the early 
nineteenth century. Once they established control, they took on the role of tax collectors in the 
numerous provinces that they governed. The earliest settlements were in Bengal, Bombay and 
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Madras.35 As their territory expanded, the British decided to centralize their control over the East 
India Company, and by 1813, an act was passed that stated that the Crown held ultimate 
authority over all of the Company’s territory.36 However, with greater oversight in the metropole, 
the British had to determine the extent to which they would intervene in Indian society and 
change their existing social structure. The government, much more so than the Company, had an 
interest in reforming India. 
The Sepoy Mutiny began on May 10, 1857 in Bengal when opposition to the newly 
issued Enfield rifle cartridges resulted in a revolt amongst the the 3rd Native Calvary unit in 
Mirath. Eighty-five Indian Sepoys had been jailed the previous day for disobeying orders to use 
cartridges that required soldiers to bite off one end of the cartridge to load the rifle. The 
animosity that the Sepoys had to the new equipment had roots in their religious traditions 
because the grease in the cartridges came from pigs and cows. For Muslims, consuming the pig 
grease would violate a fundamental tenet of their religion. As for Hindus, the same would occur 
if they consumed the grease from cows.37 To some Sepoy’s, the cartridges represented a British 
plot to defile their bodies to others, it demonstrated a lack of respect of their culture, religion, and 
traditions. 
Neither the jailing of the eighty-five Sepoys who refused to fire nor the East Indian 
Company’s decision to replace the cartridges prevented further disruption. As the British 
scrambled to suppress the uprising, the Sepoys, the day after the initial disturbance at Mirath 
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captured the old Mughal capital located in Delhi. Thereafter, the Sepoys named Bahadur Shah 
Zafar, an heir to the Mughal dynasty, emperor and de-facto leader of the rebellion.38  
While the cartridges clearly “sparked” the rebellion, they were one of many reasons why 
Indians rose in revolt. Salaries from East India Company did not keep up with the rising cost of 
living. In addition, after the subjugation of the Punjab in the 1840s, Bengali Sepoys were no 
longer entitled to a pay bonus, known as batta, given to Sepoys who they served in areas outside 
of Company control.39 
 In addition to the loss of income, many Sepoys serving amongst the British in the East 
India Company in northern India complained of unfair practices served to hinder their ability to 
gain promotion. While a few Sepoys eventually became officers in the East India Company, their 
promotions were based off of seniority, not merit. This made it difficult for Sepoys because they 
had no hope of achieving officer status until they reached old age. However, even those Sepoys 
fortunate enough to become officers had little attachment or camaraderie with their British 
counterparts because of the latter holding Company appointments such as civil service jobs in 
addition to serving in the military. This caused further divisions between army officers and 
native troops.40 
After the dual crises of the East India Company filing for bankruptcy as a result of 
overexpansion and warfare spending and the loss of the American colonies, many in Britain 
became concerned about the future of British power and reacted by increasing authority over 
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colonial possessions. Under the leadership of Prime Minister William Pitt the younger, 
Parliament passed the India Act of 1784 that established a Board of Control which provided 
government oversight of the Company while still granting it the right to rule on the ground. The 
British government also believed that Indian merchants and indigenous rulers had a corrupting 
influence on officials in the Company, and began the process of moving away from earlier 
polices of inclusion. Soon, going “Native” was no longer tolerated as Indian culture, once 
admired was characterized as backwards.41 
 The increasing presence of Christian missionaries in the subcontinent added to a tense 
situation. The Company viewed the Indian subcontinent as a region distinctly separate from 
Britain and its customs and had the sole objective in India to engage in trade and profit from it, 
not to force British customs on India. The company saw little value in Christianizing Indian 
employees. Holding a deep respect for the ancient traditions and ways of life in the subcontinent, 
the process of acculturation, where it occurred, saw British officials adopting Indian customs. 
This included dressing in “native” fashions, and many even took several Indian brides at one 
time which lead to the creation of Anglo-Indian families.42 
By 1834, the British government stripped the East India Company of its right to control 
who entered the subcontinent. This allowed Christian missionaries from Britain to evangelize in 
India for the first time, and their numbers gradually increased throughout the next several 
decades.43 During this time period, missionaries mobilized themselves through an extensive 
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network that contributed funds that financed missionary activities. As a result, missionary 
presence as well as missionary schools and hospitals increased from 1834-1857.44 Missionaries 
insisted upon Christianity and adherence to Western culture. All other belief systems were 
viewed as flawed and backwards. British missionaries, in an attempt to remake India into a 
Christian and Western nation, exacerbated growing tensions between Britain and its Indian 
subjects. 
This movement also coincided with Utilitarian thinkers who wanted to accelerate reform 
efforts in India. In 1817, the British economist, James Mill, published a multi volume history on 
India under British rule. Mill’s work marks a decisive break with Orientalist approaches that saw 
Indian culture as one to be respected arguing essentially the “backwardness” and “inferiority” of 
Indian culture. Mill attributes most of this “inferiority” to the hot climate and the role it played in 
shaping Indian character. As he stated: “The Bengalees of all ranks are remarkable for their 
ingratitude. The climate of the country, and the impurities to which they are daily witnesses, 
even in their religious ceremonies have conspired to make the Bengalees lascivious in the highest 
degree.”45 The desire to reform and alter Indian culture and ways of life led to increased friction. 
While the initial outbreak of violence that began in in Mirath was directed against the 
Sepoy’s British officers, their revolt took on a new form in the coming months as the Sepoy’s 
made their way across northern India and their targets shifted from military personnel to 
civilians. Two British encampments in particular, were targeted by the Sepoys, Lucknow and 
Cawnpore. In Lucknow, the Sepoys centered their frustrations on a government compound that 
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housed British officials and had recently assumed the role of governing the province of Awadh. 
The Sepoy’s immediately put the compound under siege where many British women and 
children took up residence. A similar situation occurred in Cawnpore as well, with the British 
civilians in this compound faring even worse. The garrison in Cawnpore, comprising some 300 
British soldiers surrendered to the 4000 man Sepoy force. The garrison was massacred along 
with the 600 women and children that they tried to defend. 
While the killing of women and children in Cawnpore in the summer of 1857 put 
enormous strains and pressures on the British armed forces to relieve the besieged soldiers and 
civilians at Lucknow, this pressure became more acute as a result of the improved transportation 
and telegraph networks that allowed information from India to be quickly relayed to Britain. 
England underwent a media revolution characterized by more robust and available newspapers. 
By 1814, The Times newspaper became more affordable and widespread thanks to new 
technological advances in steam printing that allowed papers to be printed at a much faster rate 
and in larger quantities.46 This coincided with a reduction in taxes which further reduced the 
prices and increased availability.47 Readership increased dramatically as penny presses became 
widely available throughout Britain.48  
The expansion of the press and public availability of newsprint revolutionized war 
reporting. This print revolution occurred at a time when conflict loomed on the horizon as 
Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire hoped to check Russian encroachment in the Crimean 
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Peninsula. During this conflict, the public became much more aware of the daily developments, 
especially since the telegraph allowed short messages to be transmitted quickly. More detailed 
developments would be sent by mail.49 The Crimean War gave rise to special war correspondents 
stationed on the front, capable of quickly circulating developments back to an eager British 
public.50 
The government quickly realized the centrality of the press and determined that the press 
could be an important means for providing ‘their message’ during the time of the Crimean 
conflict. As a result, many politicians used the press to their advantage. British Home Secretary, 
Lord Palmerston, made sure to cultivate a good relationship with the publishers to help further 
advance his foreign policy. One way to ensure a favorable relationship with the press involved 
providing government subsidies, especially to The Times.51 While The Times catered particularly 
to a middle class and aristocratic audience, the governments influence over the metropolitan 
newspapers also spread to several newspapers favored by the working classes such as the Daily 
News.52  
The expansion of the media in mid-nineteenth century allowed the heroic acts of 
individual soldiers and groups of soldiers to be celebrated in the popular press. Prior to this, 
Britain had the occasional patriotic display that accompanied military victories during conflicts 
of the late eighteenth century and the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century. In these 
                                                          
49 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race, and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-
1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 36 
 
50 Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History (New York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company, 
2011), 305. 
 
51  Muriel Chamberlain, ‘Pax Britannica’? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914 (New York: Longman 
Group, 1988), 105. 
 
52 Ibid., 107. 
 
27 
 
instances statues and paintings were created to commemorate Britain’s military victories. 
However, those displays only celebrated the commanding officers such as the Duke of 
Wellington.53 This changed during the Crimean War as the press began to cover how the public 
reacted to victories. Crucial to these developments were celebrations in honor of fighting men on 
their leaving or returning from battle. For instance, the Illustrated London News depicted a 
public celebration in Kingstown, Ireland that took place in early 1854 when the 50th Regiment of 
Foot departed for the Crimea.54 This shifted focus from individual heroics to the people. It 
democratized press coverage of war by creating space for individual units and common soldiers. 
During the Crimean War, Highland regiments served Britain with distinction and proved 
to be instrumental in winning some of the most critical battles in the conflict. For instance, the 
79th Highland Scots, who would later play a pivotal role in the Mutiny, served with much 
distinction. They were under the command of Field Marshall Colin Campbell, a commander who 
would also play a significant role in recapturing many of the towns taken by the Sepoys in 
1857.55 Part of the original landing force, which arrived in 1854, consisted of Highland 
regiments. The main objective of the allied forces in the Crimea involved taking the large 
Russian naval fortress located at Sevastopol.56 Yet before this could be accomplished, the British 
had to disable Russian defenses set up across the River Alma. During this battle, the British were 
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tasked with capturing defenses located on a hill at the far left flank. Campbell and the Highland 
regiments he commanded captured Alma. 
After the victory at Alma, the British pushed their way farther up the Peninsula and 
defeated the Russians at Inkerman. With Sevastopol finally within reach, the British hunkered 
down at Balaklava. As the British put Sevastopol under siege, the Russians, seeing the danger, 
desperately attempted to break the siege. On October 25, 1854, the Russians made one last 
attempt to do just that and a battle broke out between the Highland regiments and Russian forces. 
In a battle that became the epitome of aristocratic military incompetency and provided the 
impetus for army reform, after the ill-fated Charge of the Light Brigade that consisted of the 17th 
lancers, 8th and 11th Hussars, and the 13th and 4th Light Dragoons. This debacle led to 278 
casualties in a force of 670. However, the Highlanders came out relatively unscathed having 
successfully repelled the Russians. The success of the Highlanders served as a stark contrast to 
the Light Brigade. 
During this battle, the 93rd Highlanders distinguished themselves by repulsing a 
numerically superior force of Russians. Once again, Field Marshall Campbell rallied his 
Highlanders and ordered the 93rd to remain steadfast and not to retreat. As the Russian force 
inched closer to the British, the 93rd returned fire and effectively repulsed the Russian advance.57 
On Saturday November 18th, 1854, news of the battle in the form of Campbell’s recollection 
reached the British press. In The Norfolk News, Campbell credited the victory at Balaklava to the 
tenaciousness that the 93rd displayed in battle when he said: 
“During the rest of the day the troops under my command received no further 
molestation from the Russians. I beg to call Lord Raglan’s attention to the 
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gallantry and eagerness of the 93rd Highlanders under Lieutenant Colonel Ainslie, 
of which probably his lordship was an eyewitness.”58 
The immortal “Thin Red Line” as it became known in the latter portion of the nineteenth 
century, continued to be celebrated decades after the conclusion of the Crimean War. A famous 
painting by Robert Glibb, completed in 1881, entitled “Thin Red Line,” helped maintain the 
memory of the bravery of the 93rd in particular and Highlanders in general.59 
Highlanders demonstrated the importance of Scots within both the Empire and Great 
Britain and their exploits and dedication were highlighted not just in the press, but in the House 
of Commons. One Scottish MP in particular, Charles Cowan, highlighted the bravery of 
Highlanders during the Battles of Alma and Inkerman, especially their refusal to retreat in the 
heat of battle.60 While his praise was heartfelt, he also used the opportunity to express his 
opinion that Highland Scots serving in the Crimean War had not been receiving the proper 
supplies and equipment to fight the conflict.61 This kind of lobbying bore fruit in June of 1857. 
During that month, certain distinguished regiments of the British Army who served during the 
Crimean War, including the 78th regiment were scheduled to be awarded the Victoria Cross.62 
However, one colonel in the British Army, Fitzstephen French, had reservations as to whether 
the Scottish regiment should qualify for the honor considering they only lost 60 men. French 
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contrasted their experience with the Irish regiment known as the Connaught Rangers who lost 
476 men in the Crimean War.63 However, despite the back and forth in Parliament, only one 
soldier representing the Highland Brigade, and no soldiers in the Connaught Rangers went on to 
receive a Victoria Cross. 
 Major General Henry Havelock, one of the commanders that assisted Field Marshall 
Colin Campbell during the expedition to relieve Lucknow, believed that the Highland Scots who 
served under his command exhibited valor and bravery during the rebellion and should be 
recognized for it. As a result, Lieutenant-General James Outram, a subordinate of Havelock, 
went to The Times and argued that the men of the 78th Highland regiment who served under him 
should be recognized by the Queen. In Outram’s letter, he said, “Good and glorious as your 
conduct has been, 78th, your goodness and your glory have been nobly emulated by all the 
troops who have served with you.”64 While the press had given Highlanders their due, 
government rewards and recognition had still not occurred. This recognition would not come 
until after the Mutiny. Unlike the Crimean War, the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny had much higher stakes 
for Britain. The fate of the empire rested on the ability of British military forces to extinguish the 
fires of rebellion that engulfed the subcontinent.  
Approximately two months after the start of the Mutiny, Campbell was called upon to 
serve in India and supply reinforcements for the beleaguered troops languishing in the 
subcontinent. When asked to take up the post in India, Campbell said without hesitation that he 
would embark for India the next day. The London Evening Standard recounted this event in their 
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July 14th edition describing Campbell as acting with “the simplicity and ardour of a true hero.”65 
While the press saw Campbell as a “true hero,” the government which sent him back into battle 
had yet to reward him for his services. Worse, Campbell’s unit was prepared in haste and as a 
consequence, poorly rationed and supplied. George Leveson-Gower, who served as MP for the 
constituency of Sutherland, criticized the government. In particular, Campbell’s Highland 
divisions were sent without clothes suitable for the hot climate or without cap covers to hide their 
black shakos. Without such covering, they would provide an easy target for Sepoy marksmen.66 
Despite being poorly supplied and ill equipped, the Highlanders still carried out their job with 
great aplomb. 
To demonstrate the severity of the Sepoy’s actions, many of the newspapers emphasized 
atrocities involving British women and children hoping to provoke public outrage. In one 
account of the massacre in Cawnpore, the Essex Standard denounced the actions of the Sepoys 
for murdering women and children and as a result, made the claim that those who participated in 
the massacre showed themselves to be less than civilized.67 The Standard emphasized how 
poorly these women were treated before being executed: “As if this were not the ultimate stretch 
of faithless atrocity, some accounts add to the horror of the dark deed of the crime, by stating that 
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the number of the females were reserved, sold by auction to the highest bidder in the rebel camp, 
and, when done with, ruthlessly put to death.”68   
While highlighting Indian misdeeds, the British press de-emphasized and sometimes 
ignored British atrocities. The British themselves also responded with severity and brutality in 
their campaign against the Sepoys. Many of the POWS that the British captured were tied to the 
ends of cannons and executed by being blown to bits. After the conflict, members of Parliament 
justified the actions of British soldiers by reminding others of the atrocities committed against 
British women and children. As one member stated,  
“The English seemed to be now looking on the Natives as if they were mere 
tigers. I doubt not that had we seen what they had seen, had we stood on the spot 
where our countrymen with their wives and little ones had been butchered, had we 
looked into the well at Cawnpore, we should, like them, have been carried away 
by an irresistible access of indignation. In fact, we had all shared that feeling. Was 
there any Englishman so cold as not to have joined heart and soul in the cry for 
vengeance?”69 
These reports of Sepoys raping and murdering English women contrasted drastically with mid-
nineteenth century expectations of British middle class ideals. This code of conduct placed a 
significant emphasis on moral reform and improvement. In regards to gender “norms,” masculine 
self-control in sexual matters and feminine chastity and innocence made up the core themes of 
middle class ideology at the time of the Rebellion.70  
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With the attention of the British public fixated on the crisis in India, the desperation and 
sense of urgency to put down the rebellion became hard to ignore. Indian newspapers such as the 
Overland Bombay Times highlighted the plight that the British Army faced on the ground. As the 
excerpt stated in the Cheltenham Chronicle: “The alarming intelligence which the present mail 
carries to England has perhaps no parallel in the whole history of our relations with India during 
the last hundred years.”71  
Major General Henry Havelock and General Colin Campbell were placed in charge of the 
relief expedition. While the relief of Lucknow represented one small battle in an overarching 
campaign to reclaim the north of India, this battle had a dramatic impact on the ways in which 
the British would reorder their security forces in India. More importantly, it had broader 
implications as to which of its imperial subjects were best suited to protect national and imperial 
security. The most prominent group that made up the forces sent to relieve Lucknow was the 
Highland Scots. Many newspapers back in Britain chronicled the particular actions of the 
Highland Scots and their contributions the led to the relief of Lucknow. By doing so, the press 
helped transform the Scots from the feared “other” and enemy to ally and friend. However, in 
this reporting the old trope of Scottish fearsomeness and bravery was readily apparent. By 
depicting the Scot as brave and necessary to British defense highlighted English weakness and 
exacerbated English fears of imperial decline.  
After Lucknow, the British press made an effort to single out Highlanders as a race that 
had a predisposition to loyalty, bravery, and military prowess that could serve Britain and its 
empire in times of crisis. In particular, the relief of Lucknow and the many British women and 
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children that became imprisoned inside the fortress allowed the British press to contrast the 
actions of groups like the Highland Scots from those of the high caste Hindus who had 
massacred unarmed British subjects at Cawnpore in the early stages of the mutiny. Due to the 
battle performance of the Highland Scots, the British media depicted them not only as protectors 
of British Empire, but women in the subcontinent as well.72 
In one particular action during the Lucknow campaign, the preliminary capture of 
Secunderbagh was used to demonstrate the “martial” nature of the Highland Scot. Before 
Campbell and his forces reached the besieged garrison of Lucknow, they first had to retake 
Secunderbagh, a large building occupied by enemy Sepoys that provided them with fortified 
walls for protection. To accomplish this objective, Campbell made use of his artillery to breach 
the walls of the building. Once this had been achieved, the Highlanders under his command 
charged into the fortress and defeated the occupying force. Many of Campbell’s dispatches, 
which highlighted the success of the Highland regiments and their junior officers during the 
storming of Secunderbagh, eventually made their way into British newspapers.73 
By December 1857, the British effectively pacified the peripheries of India. These areas 
included Delhi, Cawnpore, and Lucknow. For the most part, the British reveled in their victories, 
and they sought to reward their commanding officers. Lord Palmerston advocated establishing a 
pension of 1,000 pounds a year to honor the service of Henry Havelock for the role he played in 
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leading the Highland Scots during the campaign to relieve Lucknow.74 Despite the celebrations 
in Britain, an ominous feeling lingered throughout the Empire in the aftermath of the mutiny. 
While the British could celebrate bringing much of India back under its control, the Mutiny 
brought to the fore questions concerning the vitality of the Empire. 
Such concerns have been emphasized amongst imperial historians throughout the last 
decade. Richard Price has argued that imperial control in the mid-nineteenth century was neither 
simple nor inevitable. In order to establish what he terms an “imperial culture” in the colonies, 
the British had to construct imperial rule through acts of violence.75 In addition, uneasy 
compromises had to be made between British legal systems and the legal practices of colonized 
peoples.76 Jill Bender asserts that empire had to be continuously constructed, and in the aftermath 
of the Indian Mutiny, British colonies readjusted their security apparatuses to suit their 
situations. As a result, the empire was not monolithic, and the governance of each colony 
required a different response to pacify its subjects.77  
By early 1858, the Sepoy Rebellion had been effectively suppressed and as a result, 
structural changes were made to the ways in which the British ruled and policed India. The 
rebellion provided the impetus to complete the process of transferring authority over India from 
the company to the government. With minds focused on security, one of the first tasks for the 
government was to determine how to reconstitute the army in the wake of the rebellion. The 
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British government tasked the Peel Commission, a parliamentary exploratory commission, with 
making recommendations as to how to best defend, police, and hold the Indian subcontinent.78  
The commission made two main recommendations. In light of the devastating effects of 
the Mutiny and based upon the testimony of British army officers who complained of the lack of 
British troops which forced an over reliance on Indian troops for security, the Peel Commission 
recommended that the number of British troops serving in India should be increased to at least 
80,000. The number had been set at 40,000 before the Mutiny.79 As a further security precaution, 
the commission advised that a two to one standard of Indian troops to British troops should be 
established. 
Before the rebellion, recruitment centered upon particular races of the subcontinent that 
the British used in the armed forces, especially high caste Bengalis. One reform proposal that 
became imperative to those in the government and the military was the disbanding of the Bengali 
regiments made up of high caste Hindus that fomented the rebellion. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, the British redefined the Bengalis as weak and decadent due to their enthusiastic support 
of the rebellion.80 Therefore, many of Bengal’s military units had to be purged and disbanded.81  
The demand for more Highlanders serving in the British Army increased after the 
Mutiny. In August 1857, London’s Evening Mail announced that some of the Highland 
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regiments currently serving in India would be returning to garrisons at Stirling and Aberdeen. 
The army hoped that the prominent presence of these units would encourage more Highlanders 
to join the British Army.82  Even metropolitan areas that rarely encountered a Highlander in any 
capacity, such as London, used the press as a vehicle to advocate their utility in the realm of 
British defense. In an October 1857 edition of the Evening Mail, a letter to the editor, 
emphasized the importance of recruiting more Highlanders into the British Army.83   
Appeals, such as those made by Lieutenant-General James Outram, a commander at 
Lucknow, who saw the performance of the Highlanders firsthand, had broader implications 
outside of the British press. These implications began to permeate into the House of Commons as 
well. General Jonathan Peel, the Secretary of State for War, had to answer the question of 
whether the Crown would recognize the services of the 78th Highland Regiment that served 
under the command of Major General Henry Havelock during a session of parliament. During 
this session, General Colin Campbell questioned General Jonathan Peel, about rewarding 
Highland units asking: “In reference to the recent distinguished mark of Her Majesty's favour 
conferred on the 32nd Foot for their gallant defense of Lucknow, whether or not it is his 
intention to recommend to the gracious consideration of the Sovereign the claims of the 78th 
Highlanders, to redeem the pledge given to this regiment by Sir Henry Havelock and Sir James 
Outram.”84 General Peel then responded by stating that he would gladly send that 
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recommendation to the Queen, considering their satisfactory performance protecting India during 
the Mutiny.85 By 1858, the mood in the British government went from being one of ambivalence 
toward the Highland Scot regiments stationed in India to one of admiration. In 1859, the 42nd 
Regiment of Foot that served unrecognized during the Crimean War finally received their first 
Victoria Crosses for their service during the Mutiny. The first recipient, Lt. Francis Farquharson, 
received a Victoria Cross for his bravery during the relief of Lucknow.86 However, their service 
took a long time to be recognized by the government.  
Throughout the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century, the Highland 
Scots played an important role in the British conflicts. Despite their service, they did not receive 
a lot of recognition in the government or the public sphere. However, the advances in news 
printing, developed during the mid-nineteenth century, brought the actions of the Highlanders to 
the forefront of popular culture. This changed was further demonstrated after the Indian Mutiny 
of 1857. During this Indian Mutiny, a crucial part of Britain’s Empire erupted in chaos, and the 
Highlanders played an important role in stabilizing the empire. Therefore, by being 
acknowledged in their crucial role during these military campaigns, the Highland Scottish 
regiments developed a reputation as fierce warriors that made them increasingly sought after in 
future colonial conflicts. 
Perceived as a martial race, Highlanders were now the preferred choice for expanding, 
policing, and holding the Empire. As a result of suppressing the Mutiny, many in the military, 
government, and the media recognized the potential for using the Highland regiments for the 
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purpose of imperial defense. As we shall see, the perception of Highlanders as fierce, loyal, 
dependable effected how all Scots were perceived as well as called for a re-evaluation of the 
Jacobite Rebellions. To some, it was also worrisome as the reliance on the Scots called into 
question the English’s ability to protect their Empire, exacerbating fears of imperial decline. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MARTIAL RACE THE NEVER WAS: THE IRISH REGIMENTS 
 
Irish soldiers comprised an important component of the British fighting force. Shortly 
before the Crimean War (1853-1856), an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Irish soldiers were in the 
British Army. These soldiers comprised more than forty percent of the British army.87 Despite 
these numbers, Irish soldiers were denied the same sort of respect given to other groups; most 
notably the Highland Scots. This chapter will evaluate why the Irish were not framed as 
fearsome fighters from a “martial race.” By doing so, I will discuss some of the tensions between 
the English and Irish during the mid-nineteenth century conflicts such as the Crimean War and 
the Indian Mutiny.  
The reasons for narrowing the focus on these conflicts are twofold. In the Crimean War, 
the expansion of the media and the popular press gave Irish soldiers a chance to be recognized 
amongst the British public, and the Indian Mutiny highlighted the British Empire in crisis, 
providing Irish soldiers a platform to be recognized as soldiers who participated in saving the 
empire. Soldiering provided one of the best opportunities of uniting the Irish with the Union. By 
denying Irish soldiers the respect they deserved the British were once again actively constructing 
the Irish as the “other,” setting the stage for future tension, violence, and ultimately, separation. 
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 From the time that Ireland joined the Union that bound Ireland with the rest of Britain in 
1800 to the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Irish forces serving in the British Army 
increased from 50,000 in 1796 to 140,000.88 By 1830, Irish recruits in the army outnumbered 
those from any other group. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the British Army used 
Irish soldiers in various theaters of war in Europe, including the Indian subcontinent and the cape 
of southern Africa.89 The number of Irish commanding officers also increased as well. As Peter 
Karsten points out, “In 1830 no less than 42.2% of all non-commissioned officers and men 
throughout the British Army were Irish.”90 Irish soldiers fought alongside the English and 
fearsome Highland Scots to extend, protect, and serve the Empire. How come the Irish forces, 
who had always served as a large proportion in the British Army, not become “martial” by the 
mid nineteenth century? Why were the Highland Scots considered “martial” and celebrated for 
their bravery while the Irish soldiers received little credit?  
Medical examiners in the armed forces believed that Irishmen proved to be more reliable 
and promising recruits because many recruits came from areas where agriculture dominated. The 
examiners believed that these occupations made the Irish healthy and physically fit for service. 
This served as a stark contrast from those who came from industrialized urban areas.91 While 
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these Irish recruits were appreciated and considered healthy, this alone did not automatically 
make the Irish a candidate for “martial race status.”92  
The Crimean War received detailed coverage by the press, and it afforded Irish regiments 
a chance to prove their worth to British authorities. For Irish soldiers and officers desiring to 
prove their mettle and gain respect, the war came when Irish influence and numbers were low. 
The reason for the decline of Irishmen in the army reflected an overall trend of decrease in the 
Irish population that resulted from a combination of high mortality and emigration. Both of these 
effects served as by products from the Irish Potato Famine that lasted from 1845-1852, and as a 
result of the decrease in population, many of the rural recruits that the army desired in the past 
were no longer available. This meant that many recruits came from urban areas. These recruits, 
due to the twin forces of poverty and industrialization were less desirable and trusted than those 
who previously came from an agricultural background.93  
Despite the lower numbers, Irish enthusiasm for serving the empire remained high. This 
enthusiasm was not shared by the English news outlets. In 1851, the Morning Chronicle 
expressed worry about the adverse effect that emigration and famine had on the quality of Irish 
recruits. The paper even complained that those serving as high as a Constabulary could not read 
or write.94 It also lamented the high death tolls from the famine by saying: “The days of 
recruiting are gone in Ireland. However, if they paraded the pauper cemeteries and were able to 
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conjure up the famine slain, an army would be raised.”95 In addition, the Irish as a whole 
continued to be seen as a backward race of people who lacked any sort of ingenuity or potential 
for progress. As the Illustrated London News stated, “The Irish are neither great on the sea nor in 
manufacturing. The Irish, consequently, have no agricultural implements of importance, and 
could not use them if they had them.”96 In addition, a sense of anxiety continued to linger about 
events in Ireland. In 1848, at the height of the potato famine, nationalist agitation in the form of 
the Young Ireland movement increased as a result of the subsistence crisis that culminated in a 
demonstration calling for a repeal of the Union by force if necessary. While this was not 
successful, fear of an insurrection that could spread to Britain itself remained. As MP, Richard 
Cobden stated,  
“Last year we were all in a panic, and could not reason on the subject. But we 
have no longer that excuse, while the trials in the courts of law in reference to the 
disturbances that did take place have thrown much light upon what has been 
unworthily dignified by the name of insurrection. It has been clearly shown that 
neither in England nor Ireland have there been 100 men confederated together 
with arms to war against the Crown and Government of this country. I believe 
that that comedy of a revolution was never sustained by meetings of more than 30 
men, and of these six or eight were spies. I believe, moreover, if what I have 
heard from magistrates and others he true, that whatever of revolutionary feeling 
there was in the disturbance here, came from Hibernian inspiration—that if it had 
not been for the Irish elements there would have been no turbulence amongst the 
English population.”97 
During this time period, when the Irish became increasingly viewed as inferior and 
increasingly dangerous, Britain, with France as an ally, declared war on Russia. The conflict, 
known as the Crimean War, ostensibly fought over British fears of Russian aggression, led 
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Britain to launch a series of assaults with the ultimate goal of capturing the naval base at 
Sevastopol, which would effectively rid Russia of its strategic access on the Black Sea. Initially, 
the British came close to securing this objective, but ultimately, the Russians dug in and halted 
their advance. By December of 1854, it was clear that the war would not be as quick and easy as 
the British government had planned. In response to these military setbacks, the House of Lords 
held a session to discuss how to bring about victory. One Irish member, The Earl of Glengall, 
believed the predominately English units fighting in the Crimea were at fault, and the time had 
come to send Irish and Scottish forces to defeat the Russians. Emphasizing the substantial losses 
that the first round of English forces suffered to both combat and disease, Glengall suggested that 
the inclusion of Scottish and Irish units would have been decisive.: 
“By the powers which the Government now possessed, they could enrol and 
embody no less than 40,000 of those Scotch and Irish troops; I very much regret 
that they had not thought it right to do so in March or April last, for, if they had, 
in all probability they would now have got 30,000 out of these 40,000 men 
together, and he did not think it was too much to suppose that, had they been 
embodied at that early period, one-half at least would have volunteered into the 
line, and thus they would have been able to add 15,000 trained men to our army in 
the Crimea. However, that was not done; and now, at the eleventh hour, when 
they had received news of the losses sustained by our army both by pestilence and 
in action, it was found necessary to send to Scotland and Ireland to raise soldiers 
to fight for their country.”98 
Glengall hoped that by convincing the government to increase the Irish militia regiments for 
service in the Crimea, they could establish a reputation as an elite fighting force. Glengall also 
made references to the “sturdiness” of these new recruits when he said, “I, therefore, hoped to 
see that, instead of the government looking to foreign soldiers, the Irish and Scotch militia would 
be called out. Our soldiers already in the Crimea would a great deal rather have these sturdy 
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young militiamen drafted into their battalions than trust to the aid of foreign troops enlisted in a 
mercenary spirit.”99 Ultimately, Glengall and his allies were successful and more Scottish and 
Irish troops were sent to the Crimea. 
 In 1855, with the help of the Irish and Scottish regiments, the British finally broke the 
stalemate at Sevastopol. While the actions of the Highland Scots have already been highlighted, 
it is important to examine the role that the Irish played in capturing the Russian base. During the 
final assault, it became imperative that the allied forces capture the trenches that surrounded and 
protected the base. However, in August of 1855, as the British forces made plans to strike at the 
base, the Russians launched an attack on the British lines. The offensive was repulsed by the 79th 
Highlanders with the crucial assistance of the Royal Irish or the 18th Regiment of Foot.100 A 
month later, the British successfully attacked a smaller fortification that provided cover for 
Sevastopol. After this battle, defeat seemed inevitable for the Russians, and they blew up the 
base as an act of capitulation.101 During this campaign, an Irishmen, Thomas Esmonde, 
distinguished himself. He would later receive the Victoria Cross for rescuing wounded comrades 
from enemy fire and extinguishing Russian fireballs that could have revealed their position.102 In 
addition, twenty-eight other Irish soldiers also received this award, but few in the government 
were willing to concede any other recognition beyond this.103 
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In an effort to rehabilitate their image after the famine period, Irish parliamentarians 
highlighted Irish bravery and dedication in the Crimea One of the difficulties for the Irish 
parliamentarians keen to improve the image of Irish soldiers and Ireland as a whole were a series 
of allegations levelled at Irish soldiers including disloyalty to the Union. These allegations were 
based largely on old prejudices which stated Catholics could not be trusted. During a session in 
1855, John O’Connell, an Irish MP from Clonmel, dismissed such allegations, asserting instead 
that a majority of the Irish units got along well, especially when a good officer led the troops.104 
Ultimately, O’Connell stated that, “I believe that my fellow-countrymen were called upon to act 
in defence of their country, their only thought would be how they could best defend her honour 
and interests.”105 O’Connell clearly believed that the duty and sacrifice displayed by the Irish 
should have garnered them respect and to be seen, not as untrustworthy, but a “martial race” for 
which the empire could depend upon. Yet again, the statements made by the Irish representatives 
fell on deaf ears. Sir George Grey summarized the discussion best when he said, “The desultory 
debate which had taken place upon this subject is a good illustration of the extreme 
inconvenience of Members bringing important matters under the consideration of the House on 
the Motion for its adjournment until Monday.”106 In short, Grey found this debate unimportant 
and not worth a discussion. 
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Meanwhile, even those at the highest levels of government, such as the Prime Minister, 
Lord Palmerston, brushed the Irish service aside and refused to give them the same respect and 
recognition afforded to English and Scottish regiments. In July of 1855, Vincent Scully, MP for 
County Cork, questioned Palmerston about his intentions of putting the Queens Irish Guards on 
equal footing when he said, “Having regard to the gallant conduct of Irish soldiers in the Crimea, 
Her Majesty's Government will recommend that a Royal Regiment of Queen's Irish Guards shall 
be embodied, with privileges similar to those enjoyed by the English and Scotch regiments of 
Grenadier, Coldstream, and Fusilier Guards?”107 While Palmerston acknowledged their service 
to Britain, he told Scully that the Irish Guards already had privilege, and the British armed 
services needed to be seen as a more united force that represented the armed forces of the United 
Kingdom and not simply England, Scotland, and Ireland. As he made clear,  
“Those regiments should be considered as belonging to the United Kingdom 
generally, and not to England, Scotland, or Ireland in particular. They consist of 
men enlisted indiscriminately from all parts of the United Kingdom, and all the 
individuals belonging to them should be considered as having an equal share in 
the glories that may attend the services of those distinguished corps.”108 
While the reason for his dismissive attitude is not clear in his remarks, the statement made by the 
Prime Minister demonstrated that no effort was taken to highlight the individual success of the 
Irish. 
The Irish would be presented with another chance to demonstrate their utility in the 
British army when a revolt in India broke out a year later in 1857. Called the Indian Mutiny by 
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the British, the revolt began when British trained Indians known as Sepoys attempted to rid 
themselves of British rule. The Sepoys killed many British civilians, and they came close to 
ridding the British of their Indian possessions. As recounted in the last chapter, Colin Campbell 
and his Highland Scottish regiments distinguished themselves in battle during the relief of the 
fortress in Lucknow, Secunderbagh. In these battles, Irish regiments fought alongside the 
Highland Scots. At their peak, the Irish comprised some forty percent of the British armed forces 
serving on the subcontinent.109  
The Irish did more than simply occupy a significant portion of the soldiers serving in 
India. They too participated in the relief of Lucknow, the fortress of Secunderbagh, and other 
battles alongside the Highland Scots. For example, during the storming of Secunderbagh by the 
93rd Highland Regiment, the Highlanders not only received the assistance of Punjabi Sikhs, who 
the British also lauded as a “marital race,” but also from the soldiers of the predominantly Irish 
53rd Light Infantry.110 In the aftermath of the battle both the Irish and the Highland Scots 
assembled before Colin Campbell who lavished praise on the Highlanders, but he did not say a 
word on the Irish regiment. As he stated in his address, “Ninety-Third, you have bravely done 
your share of this morning’s work, and Cawnpore is avenged! There is more hard work to be 
done; but unless as a last resource, I will not call on you to storm more positions today.”111 Yet if 
Irish soldiers demonstrated their utility on the frontlines of the empire, why did the British 
government refuse to recognize the long-term aid that Irish soldiers provided the British army 
                                                          
109 Jill Bender, The 1857 Rebellion and the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 16 
 
110 Tim Newark, Highlander: The History of the Legendary Highland Soldier (New York: Skyhorse 
Publishing, 2009), 125. 
 
111 Ibid., 125. 
 
49 
 
through the nineteenth century, and why did Colin Campbell not write letters to the press 
praising the Irish for the aid they gave the Highlanders by relieving Lucknow? While the British 
government provided initial recognition of the Irish, one final question remains. Why did the 
services of the Irish, particularly after an imperial crisis that put “the jewel of the imperial 
crown” in jeopardy, did the English not view the Irish as a “martial race” that could be relied 
upon?   
After the British successfully put down the rebellion, the government presented the 
Victoria Cross to individual soldiers who distinguished themselves during the conflict in India. 
For the relief of Lucknow alone, seven Scottish Highlanders who served in the 93rd regiment 
received a Victoria Cross for their efforts in that battle, and six from the 78th regiment did as 
well.112 Irish soldiers too received the recognition for their assistance in relieving Lucknow. By 
the end of the conflict, fifty-seven Irish soldiers, scattered amongst many regiments within the 
British army received the Victoria Cross for their instrumental roles in suppressing the revolt. 
Total Scottish crosses awarded were thirty-two.113  
While it might seem like a contradiction, part of the explanation for why Irish soldiers did 
not receive recognition had to do with the popular views on the army as a whole during the 
Victorian period and the type of Irish recruits that the army received during this inter-war period. 
During this time, those who enlisted in the army had a social stigma attached to them. Society as 
a whole viewed many of the recruits as those of the lower orders who could not find any other 
form of employment, or they joined because they committed a crime and sought to avoid 
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punishment from authorities.114 These problems became further aggravated as a result of 
demographic changes related to the potato famine in Ireland, and the shortfall in rural recruits. 
While these issues served as one of many push-pull factors that drew the Irish to enlist, others 
that contributed to Irish enlistment included lack of social mobility and guaranteed pay at regular 
intervals.115 Therefore, given the nature of army recruiting as a whole in the United Kingdom by 
the mid-nineteenth century, the explanation becomes clear why a group such as the Irish, who 
had a long service record in the British military, had an unfavorable image in the army 
throughout the nineteenth century.  
Ireland in itself represents a paradox in governing the empire. Since 1801, the British 
government recognized Ireland as a portion of the United Kingdom that united the island with 
England, Scotland, and Wales. However, despite the amalgamation of Ireland with Great Britain, 
the bonds that sustained the Union proved tentative at best, and authorities in Britain felt uneasy 
making the Irish co-equals in their imperial enterprise. For example the British never allowed 
Irish merchants to engage in direct colonial trades with colonies in the Americas or India.116 
However, the main point of contention, notably religion, went back centuries, and religion, rather 
than nationalism served to mark the Irish as the “other.”117 Ever since the Reformation in the 
sixteenth century, the English, who broke away from the Catholic Church, tried to shore up their 
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control of the island by imposing control over the Catholic Irish. This relationship became 
further strained in the seventeenth century during the establishment of the Ulster Plantation.  
For much of the reign of the Tudor dynasty, the Irish had risen up against their English 
occupiers. By the time James I of the Stuart dynasty ascended to the English throne, the monarch 
believed that in order to truly pacify the island, he would have to transport some Protestant 
landlords in the northern Irish region of Ulster with the intention to “civilize” the Catholic 
population. For the English, Protestantism has been a crucial institution that bound together the 
British Isles, and these bonds grew stronger when they found themselves at war with a Catholic 
power from continental Europe. As Linda Colley has stated, “Catholics could still encounter 
personal abuse and physical injury at the hands of Protestants, particularly in time of war when 
the enemy was a Catholic state.”118 During this time period in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, the British resurrected an old fear that had existed since the English first 
occupied the island in the twelfth century, that a foreign power would exploit security 
weaknesses in Ireland and use the island as a launch-pad for a potential invasion of Britain 
itself.119 
The French attempted this strategy when the ousted Catholic King of Britain, James II 
asked for their assistance in helping him reclaim the throne in 1690. However, James’s attempt 
to retake the Crown of England and Scotland failed when the Protestant monarch, William of 
Orange repulsed him in Ireland during the Battle of the Boyne. Although the battle ensured the 
Protestant line of succession, it did not assuage William’s fears of the Irish rebelling or that a 
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foreign power would use the island as a springboard to Britain. In the aftermath of the battle, the 
Protestant Ascendancy, a group of landlords who exercised their political power in the 
Parliament of Ireland enacted punitive measures known as the Penal Laws. These laws forbade 
Catholics from engaging in many political and civil liberties such as sitting in Parliament, voting 
in elections, owning firearms, and from owning a horse worth more than five pounds.  
Sectarian conflicts in Ireland consistently plagued British authorities and represented a 
security concern until the end of the twentieth century. However, the British government 
gradually lifted some of the restrictive measures imposed in the Penal Laws. The most 
significant of these measures occurred in 1829 when Catholics finally gained the right to hold 
office in Britain. Despite these developments, anti-Irish sentiment continued and took on a new 
form by the mid-nineteenth century. During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, prejudice 
centered on religious differences between Protestants and Catholics, with Catholicism viewed as 
a religion of subservience and despotism while Protestantism became framed as a faith of liberty 
and freedom.120 By the nineteenth century, religion still inflamed tensions between the British 
and Irish, but it became a secondary factor to perceived racial differences between the Irish Celt 
and the British Saxon.121 This racial divide permeated the British press during the mid-nineteenth 
century, and many publications believed that the differences further destabilized regions where 
Irish emigration was high, such as America. As one edition of The Examiner stated in 1843,  
“The Irish nationality fever, which so strongly and so morbidly affects the 
political patient with the idea that there are no ties in this world of any value 
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except those of birth and race, has gained the other side of the, and is making 
its usual ravages upon public health and common sense.”122 
This text demonstrates that to the British, the Irish still represented a security threat more than 
thirty years after the Act of Union of 1800. However, despite posing a danger to the world as The 
Examiner suggested, the British also determined that the Irish demonstrated themselves to be 
completely incapable of governing themselves.  
During the nineteenth century, the British press produced many political cartoons 
concerning racial stereotypes that depicted the Irish as inferior. These gained a significant 
amount of attention during the potato famine that lasted from 1845-1852. During the subsistence 
crisis, many political cartoons circulated through the British press that painted the Irish in an 
unflattering light, depicting them as lazy, uneducated, dependent, and child-like. One such 
cartoon, published in the satirical periodical, Punch, depicted a comparison between the 
personification of the British nation, John Bull and an Irishman whose clothes are tattered, 
uncleanly, and hunched over in a manner that resembles a monkey rather than a human. John 
Bull is shown standing upright, his clothes prim and proper, and giving the Irishman a 
judgmental look of disgust. To further explain the perceived relationship between Ireland and 
England, the destitute Irishman appears to be begging John Bull for money.123 Another cartoon, 
aimed to highlight the differences between the “civilized” British and the “uncivilized” Irish, 
published in 1843, has a similar well-attired Englishman standing by an Irishman who appears as 
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an overgrown monster with the word “repeal” on his shirt.124 This sent out the statement that the 
Irish, despite their grumblings, continued to be unfit for governing their own affairs, and the 
Union that bound Ireland and Britain together could only be administered by the English. In one 
1848 cartoon, a comparison between Britain and Ireland was made by showing Britain as a noble 
lion. As for the representation of Ireland, the cartoon highlighted the difference by showing a 
subhuman monkey next to the lion.125 
Beginning in 1830, the Repeal Association had sought a peaceful solution to Irish 
independence. By 1848, at the height of the famine, a more violent attempt came from the Young 
Ireland movement. However, despite its growing tensions with Britain, not everyone in Ireland 
took up an anti-British stance, and many remained loyal throughout bot the Crimean War and the 
Indian Mutiny. Even in southern Ireland, where the majority of the population consisted of 
Catholics, support for Britain remained strong. This proved to be the case in Monaghan where a 
group of philanthropists started a relief fund for those serving abroad in India. To demonstrate 
not only their loyalty but willingness to submit, it was decided unanimously to place the fund at 
the discretion of the authorities.126  
Irish presses attempted to combat the negative attitudes towards the Irish and Irish 
soldiers in particular by emphasizing Irish dedication and sacrifice. In many Irish papers, lists of 
fatalities were published to acknowledge those Irishmen who lost their lives in the Mutiny. 
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British presses did not regularly publish lists of Mutiny casualties, let alone Irish casualties. In 
their articles, the Irish press not only acknowledged the assistance that their native soldiers 
provided Britain in its colonial wars, but made they also made the Irish public aware of the 
sacrifices the Irish made on the battlefield.  
In one article published in the Catholic Telegraph, the paper openly chastised the British 
for ignoring Irish contributions. To demonstrate the utility of the Irish, they published a list of 
Irish soldiers killed during the Mutiny. As the article stated in reference to casualties, “Seven-
eighths of the number are Irishmen, and, with one or two exceptions, Catholics. This undeniable 
fact speaks volumes to such journals, as the Times, whose vapouring vituperation and blustering 
knew no bounds when it was asserted that two-thirds of the European soldiers in India were 
Catholic.”127 This comment also gives an insight as to the role that the characteristic of the 
Catholic faith determined the Irish national identity in the nineteenth-century. Many of the Irish 
killed in the Indian Mutiny lost their lives in the same battles that the Highland Scots fought in 
such as Lucknow. However, they were not revered by the British press in the same way. 
Part of the explanation for the lack of widespread recognition of the Irish soldiers in the 
mid-nineteenth century had to do with role that Catholicism played in the construction of Irish 
national identity and the conflicting ideals of Protestantism that the British valued. Due to the 
fact that many in Britain viewed the Irish as children, they believed that the Irish lacked the 
capacity to reason on the same level as a Briton. In their minds, they saw the dominance of 
Catholicism in Ireland as a symptom of this diminished intellect. In other words, they believed 
that the Irish could not think for themselves because of their perceived inability to reason. The 
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British believed that this supposed deficiency allowed a “subversive force” such as the Catholic 
faith, which many in Britain saw as an extension of despotism and absolute monarchy that 
dominated Irish society.128 
Despite what the British might have hoped, the Indian Mutiny would not signal the end of 
imperial disturbance. In 1865, the inhabitants of the island of Jamaica rose up in revolt against 
the British. The causes of the uprising varied, but many of the former African slaves who worked 
on the sugar plantations fell on hard times in the aftermath of emancipation thirty years earlier as 
the colony ceased to be economically profitable when other sources of sugar became available.129 
While the uprising occurred on a smaller scale than the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the suppression 
of this rebellion proved to be just as brutal, perhaps even more so. The rebellion began as a 
protest outside the Morant Bay courthouse with protesters armed with nothing more than sticks. 
Nevertheless, the order to fire had been given to the militia in charge of the island’s security, and 
the crowd dispersed. Despite the fact that the protest had ended, British officials in Jamaica took 
no chances and proceeded to execute more than four hundred Jamaicans and burn over one 
thousand homes.130 Despite the public consternation of large swaths of the British public, the 
Governor of Jamaica, John Eyre, defended his heavy handed tactics. Public pressure led to a 
government inquiry into Governor Eyre’s actions. When the committee questioned Eyre, he 
stated that the actions he took were appropriate for fear that the revolt in Jamaica could gather 
enough momentum and cripple Britain’s imperial defense in the same manner that the Indian 
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Mutiny did.131 The government inquiry ultimately concluded the Governor Eyre could not 
conclusively be charged in criminal wrongdoing.132 
The Mutiny clearly loomed large in the British imagination and this should have ensured 
all, including the Irish, who had fought to protect the empire were given their appropriate due. 
The precarious situation the British found themselves in in the aftermath of the Mutiny continued 
into the 1860s. The pressure to maintain the union with Ireland came at a time when stability in 
Ireland continued to crumble. By the 1860s, the Fenian Brotherhood, a republican organization 
founded in the United States by Michael Doheny and John O’Mahony, carried out a campaign of 
terror in Britain in the hopes of establishing an independent Ireland.133  
As early as 1863, the English Middlesex Chronicle reported on Fenian activity in the 
United States and the ramifications their separatist movement could have on the Union. 
However, the paper believed that the secretive nature of the society duped many Irish-Americans 
who had no idea about its ultimate objective of establishing an independent Irish republic. As the 
paper stated, “We are assured that they were all so thoroughly disciplined and obedient as to 
represent a formidable army available for immediate service. On a signal given the Brotherhood 
would have been ready to send from America to Ireland “an armed force of 100,000 men, as well 
as, munitions, arms, ships, and everything that the Irish nationality would need.”134 Such 
                                                          
131 Jill Bender, The 1857 Uprising and the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
152. 
 
132 Catherine Hall, Civilizing Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 25. 
 
133 Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 144. 
 
134 “The ‘Fenian Brotherhood!’ A Secret Not Known to Themselves,” The Middlesex Chronicle, 24 
October 1863, accessed 16 December 2016, 
http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000241/18631024/011/0003  
58 
 
reporting engendered fear and encouraged the English to view the Irish as disloyal an not worthy 
of their trust. 
Unfortunately for the British, who wished to disperse a significant portion of the Fenian 
Brotherhood, the organization was not in operation in Ireland, but in the United States amongst 
the Irish immigrant population. This posed a serious security concern for Britain due to the 
proximity of the American Fenians to British held Canada. The Fenians hoped that invading 
Canada would intimidate Britain into granting Ireland its independence. In one noteworthy 
attempt, a segment of Fenians, under the leadership of William Roberts launched a series of raids 
throughout 1866, while other members unleashed a wave of attacks in the British Isles. Such 
attacks did little to improve British attitudes towards the Irish.135 
 In 1866, the MP for Peterborough, George Whalley, in a speech to the House of 
Commons, made such feelings clear arguing that the Irish, driven by the Irish press and Catholic 
priests, hoped for British defeat during the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. As he stated, 
“The Roman Catholic papers had always sympathized with the enemies of the country in the 
time of war, but those journals had met with no censure or denunciation from the priests. For 
instance, in the Crimean war and the Indian mutiny, there were numerous manifestations of that 
spirit.”136 Whalley further goes on to state that Highland Scots and Irishmen shared disdain for 
each other, and they could never be trusted defend the empire in joint cooperation. In his speech, 
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he mentioned an Irish Catholic newspaper account describing the Highland regiments in an 
unfavorable light when he said,  
“In another paper, The Tablet, the editor "wished the Sepoys success." The 
Nation newspaper, a journal receiving its inspiration from Maynooth, called 
Havelock and his Highlanders fiends who dared call themselves men; and, 
speaking of the day appointed for fasting and humiliation, said it was a 
"mockery of devilworship.”137 
He also believed that a direct correlation existed between Catholicism and the actions of the 
Fenaians. For Whalley, Catholicism encouraged the Fenians to commit acts of terror.138 
After the abortive uprisings in Ireland, the Fenians, beginning in 1867, began focusing 
their attention upon acts terror in Britain itself. In the fall of 1867, Thomas Kelley was arrested 
in England for his role in the Fenian uprising in Chesire earlier that spring. During the transport 
of Kelley, the van was attacked in Manchester by a band of Fenians, and one of the law 
enforcement officers escorting Kelley died as a result. Ultimately, the attack was not a success, 
and the three men involved in the attempted raid were arrested and executed as a result.139 When 
the British press covered the incident, they consistently used the word “cowardly” to describe the 
attack. The Gloucester Journal stated that the Fenians, “committed a cowardly murder, and who 
will be assuredly hanged for the same.”140 To describe the ambush attack as an act of cowardice 
gives insight as to why the British did not see the Irish as “martial.” During the Indian Mutiny, 
the British Army labeled Bengali’s as “un-martial” because they executed large numbers of 
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British civilians in India as an attempt to intimidate the civilian population rather than fight the 
British armed forces head on.141 Therefore, the Fenian reliance on acts of terror rather than 
conventional warfare made them inferior in the eyes of the British However, the Fenians 
continued to go to greater extremes to free captured Fenians and strike fear into the British. 
 This became apparent in December 1867 when London became the latest British city to 
experience an act of terror. In this attack, a group of Fenians bombed Clerkenwell prison with the 
intent of freeing several of their comrades from captivity. The ultimate goal was to free Richard 
O’Sullivan Burke, one of the Fenians that participated in the prison van attack. During this 
attack, the Fenians underestimated the power of the bomb. Initially, the Fenians intended for the 
explosion to level a wall allowing Burke to escape. However, the explosion, more powerful than 
they anticipated, not only took out the wall, but killed twelve other people who lived in houses 
close to the jail.142 This attack fostered fear and panic throughout Britain. While Parliament 
passed security measures in relation to Ireland as a result of the attacks, many British Army 
officers believed that the laws should extend to England as well. Testifying before Parliament, 
Colonel Fitzstephen French referenced the Fenian attacks to argue for additional security 
measures in England. As he stated in his testimony,  
“Great crimes had been committed at Chester, Manchester, Clerkenwell, and 
other places. There had been threats of the assassination of Her Majesty's 
Ministers, and there had been the actual assassination of some of the police. The 
Government appeared to have taken the subject into consideration, and had 
adopted certain precautionary measures. They had increased the Metropolitan 
Police Force, and armed the constabulary with revolvers. It appeared, however, 
that the constables were not to use them in their own defence, or in carrying out 
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the law; for a constable was expected, according to the newspapers, to have three 
shots fired at him before he returned fire. That had happened in England.”143 
In addition to the security measures, the Fenian attacks also had an effect on how those in Britain 
viewed Irish soldiers as a whole. 
Overall, the fragile state of Ireland during the Fenian crisis created reluctance among the 
British government to employ Irish volunteers for peacekeeping efforts in Ireland to protect the 
island from what they called a “feeble race.”144 As the Whistable Times and Herne Bay Herald 
Stated, 
 “Although the Fenians are a feeble race, they contrive to give us a good deal of 
trouble; and not the least part thereof consists in their forcing a decision on the 
delicate question of employing Volunteers in the cases of insurrections. So far as 
we can judge, the safest plan is to ignore the existence of the Volunteers as a 
body, and employ them only as special constables.”145 
 These actions outraged Irish MPs, who claimed that it violated their rights as partners in the 
Union. As one MP from Tralee voiced his opposition when he said,  
“Why were not the Irish militia called out to go through their ordinary course of 
training? Because it was thought that once trained, armed, and equipped, they 
might disown all allegiance to the Government, and become the nucleus of an 
Irish national army. Why were not the Irish, like the English and Scotch, allowed 
to enrol themselves as Volunteers? Because it was feared that, if once enrolled 
and armed, they might endeavour to obtain by force of arms the concession of 
demands which had been refused to years of persevering and dutiful 
supplication.”146 
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By 1870, it became clear that the Fenians would not be able to stage a successful revolt in either 
Ireland or Britain. During this time, Prime Minister William Gladstone took measures to 
temporarily pacify Ireland. The centerpiece of his efforts involved an act, passed in 1869, that 
effectively disestablished the Protestant Church of Ireland. This meant that the government in 
Westminster would no longer provide financial support, and the predominately Catholic 
population of Ireland would no longer have to pay tithes to the institution.147 Yet despite the 
temporary calm of the 1870s, the government still had doubts about the reliability of Irish 
volunteers. 
In 1871, the Irish MP from Clonmel, John Bagwell, questioned the Chief Secretary for 
Ireland, the Marques of Hartington, about the potential use of Irish Volunteers for military 
service.148 Hartington did not believe that the government should be raising any volunteers from 
Ireland. While he told Bagwell that he did not base his refusal on questions of loyalty to the 
Union, he did acknowledge that the religious differences between Irish and British Volunteers 
could contribute to divisions in the army and ultimately complicate the delicate process of 
peacekeeping in Britain. As Hartington stated, “There was a great danger that the Volunteers 
might assume a sectarian character, and that the formation of Volunteer corps might be 
productive of collisions and breaches of the public peace.”149 By 1883, the decision to raise 
Volunteers had not changed. During this occasion, Colonel Edward King-Harman also 
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questioned Hartington on whether prohibitions existed against enrolling Irish Volunteers with 
British regiments.150 While Hartington stated that no act that prohibited their service existed on 
the books, he believed that the government reserved the right to accept or reject anyone 
requesting to become a Volunteer. However, he believed that if the Irish wished to serve as 
Volunteers, they would have to serve and be trained in Britain, not Ireland. He further stated that 
he had no plans to allow an Irish Volunteer Corps.151 
Therefore, while the Irish served the British loyally during the Crimean War and the 
Indian Mutiny, they did not achieve the status as a “martial race.” Despite their role in stabilizing 
the empire in the Indian subcontinent, the fears associated with the Indian Mutiny made the 
British fearful of which colony would be the next to revolt. As a result, Ireland became fixated in 
the minds of those in the British government as unstable due to its tenuous relationship with the 
colony as a result sectarian strife that stemmed from religious differences. These fears became 
further aggravated due to the rise of the nationalist Fenians who set about trying to break away 
from British rule and establish an Irish republic. During their attempts to win independence, they 
employed violence in Ireland and Britain. Concurrent to these events, Britain’s perceptions of the 
Irish continued to harden in the late eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century. During this time, 
the Irish had been increasingly portrayed in the British press as ape-like and docile individuals 
who lacked rationality and could easily be swayed to take up arms against the British. The 
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common scapegoat that served as the instigator for the turbulence in Ireland, the Catholic 
Church, the predominant religion in Ireland, had been viewed by the British as “illiberal” and 
conspiratorial. Therefore, due to Britain’s negative perceptions of the Irish and the multiple 
upheavals in Ireland throughout the mid-nineteenth century, the Irish could not be trusted for 
self-government or military service. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the number of Irish soldiers serving in the 
British armed forces began to diminish as the government became skeptical of deploying the 
Irish for imperial theaters of war and peacekeeping operations in Britain and Ireland. Despite 
previously serving with distinction in the in Britain’s mid-nineteenth century conflicts, the 
British never considered the Irish a “martial race.” However, when compared to the Scots who 
were considered a “martial race,” it is clear that the Irish deserved the title of being “martial.” 
Their services, particularly in the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Indian Mutiny in 1857 
marked the Irish out for this acclaim. While the term “martial race” did not appear until after the 
Mutiny, the constant media exposure of the Crimean War, advancements in the telegraph, and 
the massive circulation of British newspapers allowed the actions by certain regiments and 
national groups like the Highland Scots and the Irish to conceivably lauded for their sacrifices 
and highlighted in the popular presses in Britain. This construction of identity is important in a 
multi-ethnic unit such as the United Kingdom and the British Empire. The manner in which the 
English viewed the Scots and the Irish and manipulated public opinion on perceptions of the 
“other” affected how much political power and independence they allowed and how much 
participation in the lucrative empire was accepted. This ultimately colored understandings of 
Britain as a political unit.   
Therefore, after the conflicts, the Highland Scottish regiments gained notoriety as a 
“martial race” due to their actions in both the Crimea and India, and they became one the British 
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Army’s most coveted regiments for imperial defense. However, at the battles of Alma and 
Inkerman in the Crimea and the relief of Lucknow during the Indian Mutiny, the Highland Scots 
served alongside Irish regiments and received crucial assistance from those forces. While the 
fragile state of the British Empire during the mid-nineteenth century contributed to designating 
several groups within the empire as “martial races,” the destabilization of various colonial sites 
also contributed toward many groups being labeled by the British as “un-martial.” 
The Scots profited from these disturbances becoming, in many areas, the face of the 
empire. From military commanders, businessmen, to imperial officials, Scots were trusted with 
the defense and administration of much of the empire. The Irish, on the other hand, despite being 
in a position to likewise profit and prosper were characterized as the other. Despite their fighting 
for the empire abroad, calls for independence and home coupled with violence, encouraged the 
English to view the Irish as untrustworthy rather than martial. This meant, following the Mutiny, 
less opportunities for Irish soldiers and people abroad. Therefore, Ireland became an unstable 
colony while the Scots, achieved a role as a junior partner in the imperial project.  
The term “un-martial” was bestowed upon the Irish by the British during this time period 
despite the recognition that individual Irish soldiers received as a result of their services during 
the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. The prime reason had to do with the precarious state of 
Ireland within the British Empire. Throughout the 1860s, Ireland, Canada, and Britain became 
victims to acts of terror by the Fenian Brotherhood, an Irish nationalist organization that wanted 
independence from Britain and an Irish republic established. The attacks by the Fenians meant 
that the Irish could not be considered a “martial race” due to their guerrilla tactics that included 
ambush attacks and bombings that resulted in civilian deaths. These methods of warfare did not 
conform to those used by the supposedly “martial races” who demonstrated bravery by facing 
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their enemies head on and did not resort to terrorizing their enemies through killing those within 
a civilian population. 
These actions sparked debate in Britain as to what contributed to the behavior of the 
Fenians. Instead of blaming the political situation, the English turned to racial theories which 
they believed explained not only the actions of the Fenians, but all of the Irish. During the mid-
nineteenth century, race was a fluid concept that described not only biological characteristics, but 
also social and cultural behavior as well. In the case of the Irish, the destabilization of Ireland 
during the 1860s renewed long held British stereotypes about the Irish. These included an 
inferior intellect incapable of being rational that many in Britain believed contributed to the 
predominance of the Catholic faith in Ireland. Many in Britain viewed this institution as an agent 
of intolerance and tyranny that easily corrupted the “inferior” Irish people. In addition, the 
agrarian and destitute state of the island further contributed to the negative image of the Irish as 
“inferior.” Therefore, despite the fact that the British Army boasted a significant number of Irish 
recruits who served successfully in various conflicts during the early to mid-nineteenth century, 
the destabilization of the empire as evidenced by the Indian Mutiny and the Fenian terror 
campaigns that fueled the pre-existing perceptions of the Irish race as a whole. These factors 
contributed to the apprehensions of British authorities towards Irish recruits and made it 
impossible for them to be considered a “martial race.” 
Although the bestowing of the term “martial race” and the values associated with the 
term cannot wholly explain the different paths taken by Scots and Irish people after mid-century, 
it is surely indicative and symptomatic of England’s changing attitudes towards each group. By 
including soldiers into what has largely been a political narrative allows for further insights into 
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the complicated process whereby the English included and excluded groups from its imperial 
designs. 
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